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Misapplying Equality Theories: 
Dress Codes at Work 
Jennifer L. Levit 
ABSTRACT: This article provides a new perspective on Title VII caselaw 
concerning employer-mandated, sex-specific dress codes. With few exceptions, 
courts have held that employer dress codes do not constitute sex discrimination 
even when they expressly differentiate based solely on an employee's sex. In 
other contexts, courts readily acknowledge that facially sex-based practices and 
policies are presumptively unlawful under Title VII. When it comes to dress 
codes, however, nearly the opposite is true. Courts generally presume a sex-
based dress code to be permissible, and the burden falls heavily on the 
employee to show, beyond the mere fact of differential treatment, some 
additional disparity or harm, such as that the particular requirements at issue 
are more burdensome for women than for men or that they perpetuate 
stereotyped views of women as inferior or as sexual objects. This pervasive 
attitude of judicial laissez-faire toward sex-based dress codes is increasingly 
anomalous in the wider context of sex discrimination caselaw, and yet shows 
no signs of abating. This Article argues that this doctrinal blind spot is an 
unintended-and unfortunate-by-product of "second generation" equality 
theory, which downplays formal equality and focuses on anti-subordination 
principles as the purpose of equality law. While affirming the continuing 
importance and viability of second generation equality theory in the areas of 
affirmative action and disparate impact, I argue that an over-emphasis on anti-
subordination theories has skewed dress code caselaw and prevented courts 
from seeing the discriminatory harms caused by sex-specific dress 
requirements. Prescriptively, the article suggests ways for litigants to refocus 
courts on first generation principles in dress code cases. This includes strategies 
for identifying the harm caused by the formal labeling of difference, a harm 
ignored in cases of sex discrimination but well understood for race. Such a 
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litigation strategy would be more effective than pursuing the currently popular 
sex stereotyping theory, which has largely failed to expose the detrimental 
impact of sex-based dress codes on employees. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In most contexts, courts readily acknowledge that facially sex-based 
practices and policies are presumptively unlawful under Title VII.I When it 
comes to dress codes, however, the opposite is almost always true. Although 
courts have acknowledged that dress codes that impose sexually exploitative 
dress requirements 2 or one-sided disadvantages for either men or women are 
impermissible, 3 the typical dress code that simply distinguishes the appearance 
of men and women in the workplace has been found to be unobjectionable by 
4courts.
Dress code challenges have arisen in a variety of contexts, but this Article 
focuses on instances where an employer requires different dress or grooming 
1. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (invalidating a policy barring all 
women, except those who were infertile, from jobs involving lead exposure as violative of Title VII); 
City of L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (finding that a policy requiring 
female employees to make larger pension contributions than male employees violated Title VII). 
2. See EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (ruling that a female 
employee could not be required to wear a "sexually revealing ... uniform"); Marentette v. Mich. Host, 
Inc., 506 F. Supp. 909, 912 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (suggesting that sexually provocative dress code 
requirements would be impermissible). 
3. See Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028, 1029-30 (7th Cir. 1979) 
(striking down a dress code that required women to wear uniforms but allowed men to wear business 
suits); O'Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263, 266 (S.D. Ohio 1987) 
(finding impermissible a dress code requiring female sales clerks to wear a "smock" while allowing 
male sales clerks to wear shins and ties, even absent a discriminatory motive, because it "perpetuate[d] 
sexual stereotypes"); Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of Am., 337 F. Supp. 1357 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (finding that a 
male employee who was discharged for having long hair while women were allowed to have long hair 
established prima facie sex discrimination). 
4. See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding a 
policy of sex-differentiated grooming standards that allegedly burdened women more than men); Harper 
v. Blockbuster Entm't Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11 th Cir. 1998) (dismissing a challenge to a policy 
that prohibited men, but not women, from having long hair); Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 
907, 908 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding an employer policy that required male employees to have short hair 
but did not require the same for female employees); Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1380 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (dismissing a Title VII claim alleging that a grooming policy imposed unduly harsh 
requirements on women); Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 755-56 (9th Cir. 1977) 
(holding that requiring male, but not female, employees to wear ties was not sex discrimination under 
Title VII); Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977) (upholding policy that limited 
the manner in which men's hair could be cut and the manner in which women's hair could be styled); 
Earwood v. Cont'l Se. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976) (finding sex-differentiated 
grooming standards consistent with Title VII); Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685, 685 
(2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (upholding policy that required short hair for men but not for women); Knott 
v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975) (finding a grooming policy that "reflect[ed] 
customary modes of grooming" acceptable even though differences in policy existed for men and 
women); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (upholding a policy that only 
prohibited men from wearing long hair); Austin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1257 
(N.D. Ind. 1998) (finding a grooming policy requiring male employees to maintain hair length above the 
collar acceptable under Title VII); Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 
(upholding a "policy that prohibits to both sexes a style more often adopted by members of one sex" 
under a Title VII challenge); Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1392 (W.D. Mo. 
1979) (finding a sex discrimination claim insufficient where employer prohibited female, but not male, 
employees from wearing pantsuits in executive offices). 
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requirements for male and female employees: 5 either women must wear a 
particular article of clothing that men may not or men must wear a particular 
article of clothing that women may not. 6 The quintessential example is a policy 
that requires female employees to wear skirts or dresses and male employees to
7 
wear pants. 
Courts have found these dress code policies to be permissible despite the 
clarity of established disparate treatment law under Title VII and the direct 
evidence of discrimination that these policies produce. 8 I call this anomalous 
jurisprudence-the collection of cases upholding different standards of dress 
for men and women in the workplace-the "Title VII blind spot." 
9 
This Article makes both a descriptive and a prescriptive point related to 
dress code jurisprudence. First, descriptively, I argue that the dress code 
caselaw reveals that courts have relied (overly so) upon group anti-
subordination equality theory and ignore the "first-order" equality principle that 
different treatment of individuals is itself harmful even in the absence of 
demonstrable group-based harm.10 The permission slip these cases have given 
to employers to impose sex-based workplace dress policies has a pernicious 
effect on significant numbers of people. Prescriptively, courts must recognize 
5. To be sure, there are two other important categories of dress code cases, but for different reasons 
they are not addressed herein. The first of the unanalyzed category of cases involves policies that may 
more fairly be categorized as cases of disparate impact based on the employee's sex. Batson v. Powell, 
912 F. Supp. 565 (D.D.C. 1996) (holding that a facially neutral dress policy enforced against women but 
not men did not violate Title VII). For example, policies prohibiting facial hair apply to both male and 
female employees, but predominantly impact one sex. Barrett v. Am. Med. Response, N.W., Inc., 230 F. 
Supp. 2d 1160 (D.Or. 2001) (finding a "no beard" policy to be a legitimate exercise of discretion by the 
employer over the employees' appearance despite its disparate impact on men). A no-facial hair policy 
has a disproportionate effect on men since nearly all adult men have facial hair while only a minority of 
women do. A second category of dress code claims not analyzed by the Article includes those 
challenging policies that allow for discretion in one category (e.g., men can wear business attire) and 
rules in another (women must wear uniforms). O'Donnell, 656 F. Supp. 263 (finding that a policy 
requiring female sales clerks to wear smocks while allowing male sales clerks to wear shirts and ties-
that is, granting male clerks the discretion to select their clothing-violates Title VII). This Article's 
focus is on dress codes that require men to look like men and women to look like women. Though 
important and interesting, I leave for another day the disparate impact and discretion versus rules cases 
in part because of the limited success already achieved in the last category and the different legal issues 
that arise in the disparate impact cases. 
6. See, e.g., Harper,139 F.3d 1385 (prohibiting only men from having long hair); Lanigan,466 F. 
Supp. 1388 (prohibiting only women from wearing pantsuits). 
7. Lanigan,466 F. Supp. 1388. 
8. See, e.g., Fountain,555 F.2d 753; Barker, 549 F.2d 400; Earwood,539 F.2d at 1350; Longo, 537 
F.2d at 685; Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc); 
Knott, 527 F.2d at 1252; Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 896 (9th Cir. 1974); Dodge, 488 
F.2d at 1337. 
9. 1am grateful to Richard Juang for this language. 
10. See, e.g., Barker, 549 F.2d at 401 (noting the absence of disparate treatment by stating, "There 
is no allegation that women employees who failed to comply with the code provisions relating to hair 
style were not discharged. Nor is there any allegation that the employer refused to hire men who did not 
comply with the code, but did hire women who were not in compliance."); Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile 
Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1996) (distinguishing "employment policies resulting in significantly 
different levels of pension and health benefits for males and females" from hair length policies that are 
different for men and women). 
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that the public labeling of difference is not just normatively harmful, but also 
prohibited under well-established equality law.]' 
In sum, the anti-subordination principle developed by "second generation" 
equality theorists has been misapplied by courts deciding sex discrimination 
cases challenging gender-based dress codes. The harm caused by these dress 
codes is perceived exclusively as an individualized harm not shared by other 
members of the affected class. However, Title VII, the law that serves as the 
doctrinal basis of these claims does not require a showing of group harm. It 
only requires that an individual be able to demonstrate that he or she has been 
affected personallyon the basis of gender-not that all men or all women are 
similarly affected by differential treatment. Therefore, courts should analyze 
these challenges by application of what I refer to as "first generation" anti-
differentiation principles, a perspective that acknowledges individualized harms 
and imports no requirement of demonstrable group subordination. 
In Part I, I set forth the foundational concepts upon which my analysis 
rests. I explain the original, anti-differentiation principle of equality theory as 
well as the later developed group-disadvantaging principle first articulated by 
Professor Owen Fiss 12 and later refined by scholars such as Catharine 
MacKinnon, 13 Reva Siegel, 14 Ruth Colker, 15 Cass Sunstein,16 and others. 17 Part 
I also sets forth the basic analysis courts have developed in the context of 
gender-based dress code challenges. Part II tackles the project of articulating 
what is wrong with the dress code cases-including the extent to which gender-
based dress codes harm employees as well as the doctrinal and logical errors 
made by the courts. I argue that over-emphasis on anti-subordination theory at 
the expense of first generation, formal, or anti-differentiation equality theory 
has prevented courts from seeing the discriminatory harms caused by sex-
specific dress requirements. 
In Part III, I explain the two underlying sex discrimination theories that 
have been brought (largely unsuccessfully) to challenge dress codes. The first 
11.See Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964) (holding that labeling the race of candidates 
on ballots is impermissible under the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment without 
any demonstration of voter impact). 
12. Owen M. Fiss, Groupsandthe Equal Protection Clause,5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976). 
13. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1991). 
14. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 11 1(1997). 
15. Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1003 (1986). 
16. Cass Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle,92 MICH. L. REV. 2410 (1994). 
17. By grouping these theories together and describing them as "second generation," as I do below, 
I do not mean to equate them. I acknowledge their differences and important individual contributions. 
However, what they share is a rejection of an exclusive concern with what I below term the first 
generation goal of nondiscrimination law--equal treatment. As Professor Sunstein explained, there is no 
single "valid understanding of equality. On the contrary, there are many such understandings. Our 
Constitution's equality principle is plural rather than singular. It has numerous manifestations .....Id. 
at 2412. 
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of those theories, what I term a straightforward sex discrimination theory, has 
been too often overlooked as a possible avenue for challenging gender-based 
dress codes. Where pursued, this theory has been incorrectly analyzed by 
courts. The second theory, a sex stereotyping theory, has had traction more 
recently, at least when advanced by gay/lesbian and transgender litigants in the 
context of workplace sexual harassment.1 8 The success of those cases 
demonstrates the potential of the sex stereotyping theory as a basis for 
challenging sex-differentiated dress codes, but its incorporation of an anti-
subordination approach imposes serious limits as well. 
In Part IV, I discuss two recent cases-Jespersen v. Harrah's,19 a 
challenge to sex-based grooming standards brought by a long-term female 
employee of Harrah's Casino, and Schroer v. Billington,20 a challenge brought 
by a transsexual woman who lost a job opportunity she had been offered by the 
Library of Congress when her potential employer learned that she was 
transsexual. The two cases illustrate the descriptive points made, offer 
opportunities to incorporate the prescriptive one, and create a frame for 
implementing new litigation strategies to challenge sex-based dress codes. 
I. FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THEORY AND PRACTICE 
A. Anti-Differentiationv. Anti-Subordination 
The first generation principle of equality is that people should be treated 
the same, without regard to certain identity characteristics that law has 
18. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that allegations that 
employee was discriminated against based upon employee's non-conforming gender behavior and 
appearance were actionable under Title VII); Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 
F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that stereotypes about a school psychologist's maternal obligations to 
her children could not inform the school's decision to deny her tenure); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, 
Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002) (Pregerson, J., concurring) (stating that a sexual harassment 
claim brought by a gay casino employee could also be cabined within the sex stereotype framework set 
forth in Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001)); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola 
Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that evidence of same-sex harassment based on sex 
stereotyping may support a sex discrimination claim); Nichols, 256 F.3d 864 (holding that Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), applies with equal force to male employee who was 
harassed for failing to act sufficiently masculine); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st 
Cir. 2000) (noting that a bank may not deny a loan to an otherwise qualified applicant for failing to dress 
in a manner consistent with his sex); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that 
evidence that a state prison guard's actions were motivated by a transsexual inmate's gender, that is, by 
her assumption of a feminine rather than a typically masculine appearance or demeanor, could support a 
finding of a gender-motivated attack under the Gender Motivated Violence Act (GMVA)); Schmedding 
v. Tnemec Co., 187 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that evidence of male employees being labeled as 
gay by employer could substantiate a claim under Price Waterhouse); cf Miles v. N.Y. Univ., 979 F. 
Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that a male-to-female transsexual student, who was in process of 
becoming female at time ofa professor's alleged sexual harassment, was subject to discrimination based 
on sex, and could assert a Title IX claim). 
19. 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004). 
20. 424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2006). 
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determined to be irrelevant in most or all contexts. 2 1 I argue that this idea 
remains at the heart of developed equal protection jurisprudence as well as 
being the basis for Title VII, in which Congress explicitly identified the 
particular characteristics to which employers must turn a blind eye in making 
workplace decisions. 22 It stands in contrast to what I refer to as the second 
generation principle of equality that uses an anti-subordination analysis to 
determine which classification schemes survive or fail. 
1. Anti-DifferentiationPrinciples 
The first generation formal equality principle, which has alternately been 
characterized as an anti-differentiation or anti-classification principle, was 
initially theorized in Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek's foundational 
article, The Equal Protection of the Law.23 Acknowledging that equality 
guarantees cannot "demand that laws apply universally to all persons,"
24 
Tussman and tenBroek set down the foundation for modem equality 
jurisprudence by identifying the constitutional impermissibility of certain 
classifications. In other words, they argued that certain classifications, such as 
race, alienage, color, and creed, are constitutionally irrelevant and therefore 
never a permissible basis for classification. Others may call for more solicitude 
and a close, but less strict, analysis of the relationship between the classifying 
trait and the ends sought to be achieved by the use of the classification. To be 
sure, Tussman and tenBroeck acknowledged the difficulty of figuring out 
which traits lead to impermissible classification and which require a higher (or 
lower) degree of scrutiny. By analogy, however, they explained that line-
drawing difficulties are similarly raised by substantive due process analysis that 
had not "prevented a flourishing career for that doctrine." 
25 
The strength and significance of their theory contributed to the eventual 
demise of the pernicious separate but equal doctrine within the next decade. 
21. The idea here is that certain characteristics, notably race or sex, should not be taken into 
account in deciding, for example, who gets a job or is allowed to patronize a restaurant. It is a legal 
limitation. It does not, however, necessarily eradicate social or cultural preferences. See Palmore v. 
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding that the reality of private biases and possible injury they might 
inflict were impermissible considerations under the Equal Protection Clause for divesting a natural 
mother of custody of her child for miscegenation). Nor, some might argue, should it. See K. Anthony 
Appiah, Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity, 88 CAL. L. REV. 41, 43-44 (2000) ("Is it really wrong 
to pay more attention to the men than the women at the party, if I am on the lookout for a partner? 
Gender (and it is gender, not just sex) seems relevant-or at least seems so for most people. As I scan 
the party, what I am considering offering to a potential partner is not something that is invidious to offer 
only to someone who, for some reason and in some way, attracts me."). 
22. Price Waterhouse,490 U.S. at 243-44 ("[T]he very purpose of Title VII is to promote hiring on 
the basis of job qualifications, rather than on ...the forbidden criteria: race, color, religion, sex, and 
national origin."). 
23. Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341 
(1949). 
24. Id. at 343. 
25. Id. at 355. 
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Moreover, their theory has become the well-established approach to equal 
protection analysis. It also was imported beyond the constitutional equal 
protection analysis that it addressed into modem civil rights law, including 
Title VII. Title VII adopted the anti-classification or anti-differentiation 
principle by identifying protected traits that cannot lawfully be the basis of 
discrimination in the workplace. 26 By its text and developed doctrine, Title VII 
is a clear example of first generation equality law. 
The 	rhetoric associated with this first generation equal treatment mandate 
included that the law could "permit[] absolutely no distinctions of any kind 
based on" prohibited categories. 27 As their foes interpreted them, equality laws 
would "obliterate[] every restraint on intermingling." 28 In the analogous context 
of race, the rule is explained as "[t]he law should know nothing about a man's 
2 9 
color." 
To apply first generation principles, one need only look to the language of 
the classification; if a policy or law differentiates, it is presumed suspect. 
Applying this approach to sex-based dress codes, one quickly sees a problem 
with them because they do just what first generation principles question-they 
classify employees by sex and treat them differently based solely on that 
classification. 
2. 	Rejection of the Anti-DifferentiationPrincipleandDevelopment ofAnti-
SubordinationTheory 
A key problem with the first generation account is its application in certain 
contexts where treating individuals the same regardless of identity 
characteristics exacerbates or perpetuates inequality (disparate impact)30 or 
where different treatment may be justified by the need to correct existing 
imbalances that have resulted from a history of discrimination (affirmative 
action). 31 As Owen Fiss explained in his foundational article, which he wrote 
26. While initially only addressing discrimination in private employment, Title VII was later 
amended to prohibit discrimination in public employment as well. Equal Employment Opportunity Act 
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. 
27. John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro, The OriginalUnderstanding of "'EqualProtection of The 
Laws, " 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131, 147 (1950). 
28. 	 Id. 
29. Id. at 148 (quoting I MCPHERSON'S SCRAPBOOK, ELECTION OF 1866, at 117-18); see also 
Alexander M. Bickel, The OriginalUnderstandingand the SegregationDecision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1955). 
30. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (noting disparate impact associated with written 
test); Berkman v. City of New York, 812 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting disparate impact associated 
with strength tests); Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 642 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting disparate 
impact of head-of-household rule). 
31. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (finding that the University of Michigan's 
undergraduate admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause because its use of race was not 
narrowly tailored to achieve the asserted compelling state interest in diversity); Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that a federal program designed to provide highway contracts 
to disadvantaged business enterprises must be reviewed by the court on a case-by-case basis under a 
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partially in reaction to the development of equal protection doctrine based on 
Tussman and tenBroeck's analysis, "The antidiscrimination principle has 
structural limitations that prevent it from adequately resolving or even 
addressing certain central claims of equality now being advanced [preferential 
treatment and disadvantaging, yet facially neutral criteria]. For these claims, the 
antidiscrimination principle either provides no framework of analysis or, even 
worse, provides the wrong one." 32 Although Fiss offered a number of broad 
criticisms of the first generation account, 33 his principle challenge was to its 
practical limits in the hardest cases then being pursued in the courts. The 
alternative model that he offered has developed into a series of nuanced 
versions of related ideas, the collection of which I broadly refer to as second 
generation accounts. At the heart of all of them is a concern about practices that 
reinforce the "subordinate position of a specially disadvantaged group." 
34 
Second generation equality theory provides a framework for explaining 
departures from first generation principles of anti-differentiation in certain very 
important contexts either where treating people the same perpetuates 
subordination or where treating people differently does. 35 Numerous other 
scholars since Fiss have further developed his analysis. Their refinements 
include taking into account the unique historical results from sex 
discrimination, 36 offering a model for its enforcement in the legislative and 
executive realms, 37 and suggesting more ways to instantiate it in disparate 
strict scrutiny standard). Early criticisms of first generation accounts often used first generation rhetoric 
to develop second generation ideas. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Constitutionalityof Reverse Racial 
Discrimination,41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974); James W. Nickel, PreferentialPolicies in Hiringand 
Admissions: A JurisprudentialApproach, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 534 (1975). 
32. Fiss, supranote 12, at 129. 
33. Fiss criticized the antidiscrimination principle on two levels. First, he suggested that the ideals 
of the approach-objectivism, individualism, and universalism-"may not have any intrinsic merit" or 
that those ideals may not be advanced by the antidiscrimination principle. Id. at 121, 123, 128-29. But, 
the majority of his critique addressed what he referred to as "structural limitations" of the 
antidiscrimination principle. Id. at 129. Specifically, Fiss saw the antidiscrimination principle as flawed 
because: (1) pure application of the principle suggested that preferential treatment and discriminatory 
treatment were both impermissible, id.; (2) the antidiscrimination principle only recognizes 
discriminatory state conduct as problematic, leaving those harmed by other objectionable state conduct 
unprotected, id. at 136; and (3) the antidiscrimination principle provides no protection where state 
conduct "does in fact discriminate among persons, but not on the basis of a suspect criterion," even 
where the conduct disadvantages members of a group protected from discriminatory state conduct, id. at 
141. Although he identified ways that courts had dealt or could deal with these shortcomings, he noted 
that those approaches often ran contrary to the logic underlying the antidiscrimination principle. Id. at 
129, 136, 140-41, 146. 
34. Fiss, supra note 12, at 157. 
35. A slightly different approach to this second generation theory has been to credit women for the 
value of unpaid labor in order to put them on a level playing field with men whose work is traditionally 
(and, as importantly, financially) credited. See Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor Into Love: 
Housework andthe Law, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1996). 
36. Colker, supranote 15. 
37. Sunstein, supranote 16. 
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impact cases. 38 Although many of these scholars offer a comprehensive 
framework for supplanting first generation analysis, 39 few acknowledge the 
way in which a total retreat from anti-differentiation creates a problem in cases 
where the majority of the affected class may not be negatively impacted even if 
a minority is to a high degree. That is, they do not take into account the dress 
code cases. 
B. Courts Legal Analysis in Dress Code Challenges 
By and large, courts reject gender-based dress code challenges.40 They do 
so in one of two ways: (1) they dismiss a challenge out of hand by completely 
rejecting a claim that the imposition of gender-based cultural or societal norms 
could be at all pernicious 41 or (2) they acknowledge the possibility of individual 
harm but require a group-based demonstration of harm to defeat a dress code.42 
Under either approach, courts apply an anti-subordination approach either 
implicitly (the category one cases) or explicitly (the category two cases). 
Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co. 43 is typical of the first 
approach. In that case, a male employee brought a sex discrimination claim 
against an employer that refused to hire him because of the length of his hair.44 
The potential employer, Macon Telegraph Publishing Company, had adopted a 
hair length requirement for men because of its perception that the community 
"was particularly sour on youthful long-haired males., 45 This souring was the 
result of an "International Pop Festival" held in a neighboring town that was 
attended by "hundreds of thousands of young people, 46 many with long hair.47 
38. Charles R, Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious 
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987); see also Reva Siegel, Reasoning From the Body: A Historical 
Perspective on Abortion Regulation andQuestions ofEqual Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv. 261 (1992). 
39. Ruth Colker, perhaps most clearly, takes on the affirmative project of suggesting a framework 
for incorporation of the proposed anti-subordination principle into all equal protection analysis. Colker, 
supranote 15. 
40. See supranote 4. 
41. E.g., Harper v. Blockbuster Entm't Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (1 1th Cir. 1998); Willingham v. 
Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975); Fagan v. Nat'l Cash Register Co. 481 F.2d 
1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1392 (W.D. Mo. 1979); 
Jahns v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 391 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Mo. 1975); Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 389 F. 
Supp. 856 (E.D. Mo. 1975); Boyce v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 402 (D.D.C. 1972); Roberts v. 
Gen. Mills, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1055 (N.D. Ohio 1971). 
42. E.g., Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004); Tavora v. N.Y. 
Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1996); Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 
755-56 (9th Cir. 1977); Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977); Baker v. Cal. Land 
Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 896 (9th Cir. 1974); Wamsganz v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 391 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. 
Mo. 1975); Bujel v. Borman Food Stores, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 141 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Roberts, 337 F. 
Supp.1055.
 
43. 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975). 
44. Id. at 1087. 
45. Id. at 1087 n.3. 
46. Id. at 1087. 
47. The festival was undoubtedly attended by both young women and men with long hair, but 
apparently the community only soured on men with long hair. 
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Although initially successful, Willingham lost in an en banc opinion. The 
court explained that "the undisputed discrimination practiced by Macon 
Telegraph [wa]s based not upon sex, but rather upon grooming standards," 
which were outside the proscription of Title VII. 48 In other words, the employer 
had justified its seemingly sex-based different treatment of employees not by 
its consideration of their sex, but by its incorporation of community standards. 
This approach ignores the possibility that community standards could be 
discriminatory or prejudicial. 
The second approach to sustaining gender-based dress codes is exemplified 
by the decision in Jespersen v. Harrah'sOperating Co. 49 In Jespersen, the 
Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, rejected a Title VII challenge to Harrah's 
Casino's policy requiring female bartenders to wear makeup, nail polish, and 
styled (teased or curled) hair.50 The Ninth Circuit held that a demonstration of 
differential treatment of men and women was insufficient to state a prima facie 
case. Rather than looking to well-established precedent in which facially sex-
based practices and policies have been found presumptively violative of Title 
VII, 5 1 the court only looked to cases involving appearance policies-ironically, 
two cases in which the court had struck down sex-based weight requirements. 
52 
But rather than following those cases, the court distinguished them from 
Jespersen's case and explained that because "[n]ot every differentiation 
between the sexes in a grooming and appearance policy creates a 'significantly 
greater burden of compliance,"' a plaintiff in a dress code case must 
demonstrate not just the existence of a sex-based policy but also that the policy 
is "more burdensome for women than for men." 53 In other words, the court 
required a showing that the policy did not simply differentiate between men 
and women but subordinated one gender to the other. 
Although this "unequal burdens" requirement was arguably first 
characterized as such in the Jespersen case, the approach of including an 
additional pleading requirement in complaints against dress codes is hardly 
unique. Many other courts have imposed similar additional requirements, even 
if not articulated in so many words. For example, the Sixth Circuit dismissed a 
Title VII claim challenging a workplace policy that "explicitly permitted 
long hair but forbade male employees to do so." 
54 
female employees to wear 
Much like the Ninth Circuit in Jespersen, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged the 
sex-based differential treatment but said that for differential treatment in the 
48. Id. at 1088 (citation omitted). 
49. 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006). 
50. Id. at 1107. 
51. See supra note 1. 
52. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Gerdom v. 
Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982), and Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845 (9th 
Cir. 2000)). 
53. Id. at 1111. 
54. Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 402 (6th Cir. 1977) (McCree, J., dissenting). 
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context of appearance to be actionable, it must be within the traditional 
meaning of the "concept of discrimination.'' s5 By requiring both sex-based 
differential treatment and evidence of more traditional discrimination, the Sixth 
Circuit seemed to import the concept of anti-subordination into the Title VII 
context. For example, the court thought different requirements regarding 
employee hair length were too unrelated to the harms Congress sought to 
address in Title VII, but demonstrations of differential enforcement policies, 
which would show that one sex was being treated as less valuable, might 
provide sufficient evidence of discrimination. 
In a more recent challenge to a hair length requirement, the Second Circuit 
similarly took an anti-subordination approach to assessing the validity of a 
claim. 56 The Second Circuit explained (with no support) that the doctrine had to 
account for the "factual context" of a case. Moreover, the court distinguished 
the precedential direct evidence cases as involving employment policies that 
resulted in significantly different levels of benefits for males and females. In 
other words, the problem with the plaintiff's challenge to a hair length 
requirement was the failure to show that the policy had the requisite 
subordinating effect. 
By either approach--dismissing out of hand challenges to social and 
cultural gender norms or requiring a group-based demonstration of harm-the 
dress code challenges reveal that courts have been strongly influenced by anti-
subordination principles where neither the language nor the doctrine of Title 
VII requires it. 
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH DRESS CODES 
The dress code caselaw has spawned many problems for employees, 
lawyers, and academics. It has permitted employers to impose sex-based 
workplace policies that have a pernicious effect on people whose gender 
identity does not fit within cultural norms. In addition, it has distorted 
foundational employment law principles as well as the equality theories that 
have developed to fill in the contours of equality law. 
A. 	 Gender-BasedDress Codes Have a Serious Negative Impact on Many 
People even ifOthers Experience Them as Benign 
The strength of the anti-differentiation principle for dress code challenges 
is its recognition of the individualized nature of the harm that dress codes 
55. 	 Id. at 401-02 (citing Gen. Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)). 
56. 	 Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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present. 57 Dress codes that require gender-stereotypical appearance for women 
and men do not affect all people to the same degree. Indeed, for most gender 
conforming men and women, the typical sex-based dress code policy is 
unobjectionable. For others, however, having to appear stereotypically 
feminine or stereotypically masculine is so discordant with their identities that 
it may result in a total inability to remain employed in a particular workplace. 
The power, therefore, of the anti-differentiation approach to equality for dress 
code challenges is that the discrimination in a dress code policy "inheres in the 
not in its impact on any group or class." 
58 
structure... 
The Jespersen case powerfully illustrates the stakes of a gender-based 
dress code for one female employee even though its impact on other women 
may have been benign. Darlene Jespersen, twenty-year employee of Harrah's 
Casino, left her employment rather than wear make-up--which shows how 
traumatizing the requirement was to her. In deposition testimony, Jespersen 
explained that her employer's dress code made her feel so "very degraded and 
very demeaned" that she could not perform her job. The court did not question 
the sincerity of her reaction. 
59 
While such an extreme reaction may be hard to understand for some, it is 
understandable, and perhaps not unusual, where a gender-based dress code 
forces someone to conform to a gender identity not his or her own. 
Scientifically, it has been suggested that gender identity-one's "total sense of 
self as being masculine or [feminine]" 6 0-is deep-seated, generally impervious 
to manipulation or change, and "pervades one's entire concept of one's place in 
life. It is well established that a person's core psychological sense of who 
they are as either male or female is fixed at a very early age and is generally 
impervious to change.62 In cases involving transgender litigants, 63 courts have 
acknowledged this consensus view. 6 4 Indeed, studies that have been done on 
57. Admittedly, this same individualized focus which is such a strength in the context of dress 
codes has been criticized as embodying a "limited conception of equality." See Fiss, supra note 12, at 
108. 
58. Notably Fiss invokes this as a criticism of the Tussman and tenBroeck conception of 
antidiscrimination. See id. at 127. 
59. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 2006); id. at 1118 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) 
60. SUZANNE J. KESSLER & WENDY MCKENNA, GENDER: AN ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL 
APPROACH 8-11 (1978); John Money, GenderRole, Gender Identity, Core Gender Identity: Usage and 
Definition of Terms, 1 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHOANALYSIS 397-403 (1973). 
61. M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 205 (N.J. Super. 1976) (quoting testimony of Dr. Ihlenfeld, 
plaintiffs medical doctor). 
62. Id. at 205 (citing an expert witness testifying that "[t]here was ... 'very little disagreement' on 
the fact that gender identity generally is established 'very, very firmly, almost immediately, by the age 
of 3 to 4 years."' ). 
63. A transgender person is one whose innate sense of being male or female differs from his or her 
birth sex. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1865 (27th ed. 2000) (defining a transgender person as 
one "with the external genitalia and secondary sex characteristic of one sex, but whose personal 
identification and psychosocial configuration is that ofthe opposite sex"). 
64. Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 163 (D. Mass. 2002) ("The consensus of medical 
professionals is that transsexualism is biological and innate."); Doe v. McConn, 489 F. Supp. 76, 78 
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the etiology of transgender identities reflect a strong physiological basis for the
65 
condition. 
In part because of courts' acknowledgement of the deep-seated nature of 
gender identity, transgender people have made significant progress in reversing 
a course of exclusion from the law's protection. 66 In cases challenging dress 
requirements, transgender litigants have successfully demonstrated the harm to 
individuals of having to express a gender inconsistent with their internalized 
sense of who they are as male or female.67 For example, a Massachusetts court 
recognized that a biologically male student with a female gender identity who 
was forced by school officials to dress in a masculine presenting manner risked 
her "health and well-being.' 
68 
Several recent studies, which likewise focus principally on the effect of 
discrimination in the lives of transgender people, highlight the economic 
consequences of gendered expectations in the employment context. A 1994 San 
Francisco Human Rights Commission report found that "the economic hardship 
imposed on some transgender (particularly male-to-female) persons due to 
discrimination in employment and in medical and insurance services frequently 
forces them to live in poverty or to turn to sex work to survive. ' 69 A 2000 study 
by the same Commission found unemployment among some segments of the 
community to be "an astronomical 70%. ",70 Another recent study of the 
economic impact on the transgender community in the San Francisco area 
revealed a remarkable figure of 64% of survey respondents earning less than 
$25,000 a year and nearly 80% earning less than $50,000.71 
(S.D. Tex. 1980) ("Most, if not all, specialists in gender identity are agreed that the transsexual 
condition establishes itself very early, before the child is capable of elective choice in the matter, 
probably in the first two years of life; some say even earlier, before birth during the fetal period."); In re 
Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 78 (Md. 2003) ("Because transsexualism is universally recognized as inherent, 
rather than chosen, psychotherapy will never succeed in 'curing' the patient."). 
65. See Jaing-Ning Zhou et al., A Sex Difference in the Human Brain and its Relation to 
Transsexuality, NATURE, Nov. 2, 1995, at 68-70; F.P. Kruijver et al., Male-to-Female Transsexuals 
Have Female Neuron Numbers in a Limbic Nucleus, 85 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 
2034-41 (2000). 
66. See infranote 158. 
67. See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust 
Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000); Lie v. Sky Publ'g Corp., 15 Mass. L. Rptr. 412 (Super. Ct. 2002); 
Enriquez v. W. Jersey Health Sys., 777 A.2d 365 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
68. Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000) 
(recognizing that the "plaintiff's ability to express herself and her gender identity through dress is 
important to her health and well-being"). Moreover, the court acknowledged that the school 
administrators' imposition of the male dress code on the student would "stiffel... plaintiffs selfhood." 
Id.at *7. 
69. SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, INVESTIGATION INTO DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
TRANSGENDERED PEOPLE 46 (1994), availableat http://www.ci.sf.ca.us/sfhumanrights. 
70. SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT FOR THE LESBIAN GAY 
BISEXUAL TRANSGENDER COMMUNITIES 10 (2000), available at http://www.sfgov.org/site/ 
uploadedfiles/sfhumanrights/docs/econ.pdf. 
71. SHANNON MINTER & CHRISTOPER DALEY, TRANS REALITIES: A LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT 
OF SAN FRANSCISCO'S TRANSGENDER COMMUNITIES (2003), available at 
http://www.transgenderlawcenter.org. 
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A person's gender identity is no less central and significant to a non­
transgender person. However, that fact is often missed by people whose 
identities happen to conform to gendered norms. In other words, someone who 
is biologically female and whose gender identity is also principally feminine 
may not recognize that her identity as feminine is a core aspect of her identity 
because society's expectations of how she should look and act likely do not 
depart from her sense of self. However, for persons like Darlene Jespersen, 
whose employers' expectations of how they should look and act depart from 
their internalized sense of how they should look and act, the harms associated 
with gender-based dress codes are quite severe. 
In The Last Time I Wore A Dress, author Daphne Scholinski detailed the 
severe psychological trauma experienced by being forced to present in a 
72 stereotypically feminine appearance. Scholinski's memoir describes the 
experience of being involuntarily institutionalized and facing curative therapies 
because she did not share in prevailing societal gender norms. Many other 
anecdotal and documented reports reflect similar experiences of harm, 
including hospitalization due to the dysphoria of having to conform to 
73  





For anyone who wonders about the degree of harm imposed by gender-
based dress codes, Scholinski has recommended a thought experiment that asks 
readers to imagine being forced to express their gender identity in a way 
inconsistent with their sense of self. Furthermore, she asks them to imagine 
doing so not as a lark, but rather against one's will-first for a day, then a 
week, and then for a more extended period of time. "Try it. Wear an outfit that 
is utterly foreign-a narrow skirt when what you prefer is a loose shift of a 
dress. Tom-up black jeans when what you like are pin-striped wool trousers. 
'75 ForSee how far you can contradict your nature. Feel how your soul rebels. 
employees faced with gender-based dress codes the stakes are high. The 
consequence is that some lose their livelihoods rather than face their souls' 
rebellions. 
The power of the first generation anti-classification principle is that it 
acknowledges the individual harms associated with stereotypical and different 
treatment of men and women despite the fact that many (perhaps even most) 
women and men are untouched by the imposition of gender-based dress 
requirements because they are gender conforming. 
72. DAPHNE SCHOLINSKI, THE LAST TIME I WORE A DRESS (1997). 
73. An extreme example of this phenomenon was captured in a major release film about the life of 
Brandon Teena who was severely beaten, raped, and murdered when his group of "friends" learned that 
he was biologically female but living as male. Boys DON'T CRY (Hart-Sharp Entertainment 1999). 
74. Elaine Porterfield, Judge Wants Women Attorneys to Wear Skirts in Her Courtroom, SEATTLE 
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 30, 1999, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/dres30.shtml 
(reporting on an attorney chastised by the court for wearing a pantsuit instead of a dress or skirt). 
75. SCHOLINSKI, supranote 73, at x-xi. 
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B. 	 Courts' Errorsin Applying Second Generation Theories in Dress Code 
Challenges 
Courts upholding dress codes have been overly persuaded by contemporary 
articulations of the group anti-subordination purposes of nondiscrimination 
law. 76 The proof of this rests in no small part on the fact that neither the 
language of Title VII nor the doctrine that has developed in its application 
requires a demonstration of group subordination. The relevant Title VII 
language takes a first generation approach to discrimination by prohibiting the 
individual classification or differentiation of employees on account of sex.77 
Moreover, as a matter of doctrine, Title VII requires only direct evidence of 
different treatment. 78 Perhaps recognizing the limits of first generation analysis, 
Title VII permits second generation analysis as a fallback (or alternative 
position) for litigants, by allowing burden shifting in cases where direct 
evidence is not available. 
Despite this clear doctrinal incorporation of both first and second 
generation principles, most courts in the context of dress code challenges 
brought under Title VII have required not simply a demonstration of 
classification or differentiation by sex but, in addition, a group subordinating 
effect.79 In other words, departing from basic doctrine, courts have declined to 
apply first generation principles to dress codes and instead required a showing 
of subordination. Although a subordinating effect has been demonstrated in a 
small number of dress code challenges, 80 that fact does not justify its wholesale 
adoption in the field. Moreover, requiring a demonstration of subordination is a 
departure from doctrine and a denigration of first generation principles. 
76. See supra note 10; see also Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1110-11 (9th 
Cir. 2006). ("Our settled law in this circuit ... does not support Jespersen's position that a sex-based 
difference in appearance standards alone, without any further showing of disparate effects, creates a 
prima facie case."). 
77. 	 Title VII states:
 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer­
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
 
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
 
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
 
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
 
religion, sex, or national origin.
 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
 
78. See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text. 
79. See supra note 42. 
80. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. 
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C. 	 The Dress Code Cases HighlightSome ImportantLimitationsofSecond 
Generation Theories 
Although anti-subordination theory is important where "equal" treatment 
ignores the harm nonmajoritarian class members face in failing to meet 
majoritarian standards, courts should not allow these critical theories to erase 
the widely shared foundational point that harm is inherent in different 
81 
treatment. 
Moreover, if second generation anti-subordination theory has led courts to 
hold that successful sex discrimination challenges to dress code policies require 
a demonstration of group-based harms, this suggests two possible structural 
criticisms of second generation theory. 82 Specifically, the Title VII blind spot 
either exposes real and serious errors in anti-subordination theories or it 
supports a limiting principle for the application of such theories. While it is not 
my objective to condemn anti-subordination theory wholesale, the analysis 
herein suggests that perhaps just as "hard cases make bad law,"8 3 so too might 
the hard cases of affirmative action and disparate impact claims make bad 
theory. At a minimum, perhaps these cases have introduced flawed theory that 
invites reform to account for the problematic dress code cases. More modestly, 
the dress code cases may suggest that anti-subordination theories should be 
limited to the types of cases around which they developed, leaving anti-
differentiation principles in place for the others. In other words, the Title VII 
blind spot suggests that anti-subordination theories should be limited to cases 
involving disparate impact or affirmative action, leaving anti-differentiation 
theories untouched in the main. This conclusion suggests that courts that have 
required a demonstration of a group harm in dress code challenges are wrong 
and should revisit their analysis in future cases. 
81. Indeed, the use of immutable characteristics to "categorize" people into distinct groups often 
has the pernicious effect of arousing private prejudice against groups that do not yet enjoy majoritarian 
support in the public square. In Anderson v. Martin, by way of example, the Court observed that 
allowing state-required publication of a candidate's race on ballots for elected office "direct[ed] the 
citizen's attention to the single consideration of race or color, [thereby] indicat[ing] that a candidate's 
race or color is an important-perhaps paramount-consideration in the citizen's choice." Anderson v. 
Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964) (striking down a Louisiana statute requiring the publication of 
candidates' race on election ballots precisely because the law implied that the government sanctioned 
private classifications). The Court's subsequent reasoning is instructive: "The vice lies not in the 
resulting injury but in the placing of the power of the State behind a racial classification that induces 
racial prejudice at the polls." Id. 
82. Admittedly, this is a criticism that is shared by the framers of the theories I address. See 
Sunstein, supranote 16, at 2431 ("Should we not speak of individuals instead of groups? ...Freedom 
from desperate conditions is a liberal principle connected with both equality and liberty, and it can be 
violated even in the absence of group-based disadvantages."). Sunstein, at least, acknowledges the 
possibility of complementary and overlapping theories, which may be instrumental in addressing parts 
of, if not the entire, problem. His approach is a micro-application of the approach I offer in this Article. 
That is, I argue here that the combination of first and second generation nondiscrimination theory may 
be necessary to remedy the problem associated with the dress code exception to existing equality laws. 
83. 	 N. Sec. Co. v. U.S., 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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D. Why DifferentiationIs ItselfProblematic:The Sex-Tag Example 
To the extent that this analysis is correct-that is, that second generation 
principles should apply only in the types of cases in which they arose, leaving 
first generation principles generally untouched-the following hypothetical 
demonstrates why the dress code cases have by and large been wrongly 
decided. 
Imagine that an employer allows its employees to wear whatever clothing 
they wish in the work environment as long as they consistently, each morning, 
place a tag on their shirt (or dress or blouse) that indicates whether they are 
male or female. 84 Imagine as a second example an employer that strictly 
prescribes type of clothing and manner of grooming (including hair length and 
nail style) according to an employee's sex. This example includes an employer 
with a policy requiring women to wear only skirts or dresses, to have long 
nails, and to wear make-up, and men to wear only slacks and tailored shirts, to 
have short, trimmed nails, and to wear no make-up. Each policy has the effect 
of conveying to others the sex of the individual employee. Each requires a 
determination of an employee's sex and some outward expression or statement 
of it. 
Importantly, in the sex-tag example, the employer merely requires a public 
indication of the employee's sex and imposes no gender norm. To the extent 
any gendered norm does attach, the norm is voluntarily expressed by the 
individual employee. In the dress code example, on the other hand, the 
employer requires the employee not only to publicly identify his or her sex, but 
also requires him or her to incorporate a particular norm of gender expression. 
To the extent that the two examples can be compared quantitatively, the 
dress code example could be described as being more imposing than the first, 
equal to the sex-tag example with some additional terms. Stated as an equation, 
one might say that the "dress code example = the sex-tag example + the 
gendered norm as defined by the employer." Understood as such, and using 
basic modem mathematical principles, if the sex-tag example is impermissible, 
the dress code example should be as well, unless the addition of a gendered 
norm is what makes the dress code permissible. Because analytically the 
addition of an imposed gendered dress norm should make a policy worse, not 
better, under nondiscrimination laws, thinking about the permissibility of the 
84. Much has and could be written about the criterion for determining whether an individual is 
male or female. See generally Julie Greenberg, When Is a Man a Man and When Is a Woman a 
Woman?, 52 FLA. L. REV. 745 (2000); Julie Greenberg, DefiningMale andFemale: Intersexuality and 
the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARiZ. L. REV. 265 (1999). For purposes of this Article, 
assume simply that the employer permits an employee to identify as either male or female at the time of 
employment based on government-issued identification. Nothing in this Article's analysis turns on the 
complexity, if any, of determining a person's sex. 
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sex-tag example may advance a clearer understanding of the impermissibility 
of dress codes based on gender norms. 
Analyzing the sex-tag example under first generation principles both 
proves this point and demonstrates that the very act of identifying employees 
by their sex is prohibited under well-established precedent in the race context. 
Moreover, the labeling example illustrates why courts should not overlook first 
generation theory in cases that do not involve either disparate impact or 
affirmative action. 
In Anderson v. Martin,85 the Supreme Court addressed the question of 
whether a Louisiana statute could require that ballots place the race of 
86 candidates for elective office alongside their names. In defending the 
plaintiffs' equal protection challenge, Louisiana argued that it was simply 
providing otherwise publicly available information to voters, drawing no 
and suggesting nothing about the relevance of the information. 
87 
conclusions 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court struck down the practice.8 8 As the Court 
explained, the problem with the race-tag alongside the name was not that the 
tag itself created an injury, but rather that (1) the State had "fumishe[d] a 
vehicle by which racial prejudice" might be aroused, and (2) the State had, by 
definition, demarked that characteristic as "important" by requiring the race-tag
89 
to be placed alongside candidate's names. 
Like the race-tag example presented by Anderson v. Martin, cases where 
an employer is permitted to require employees to tag themselves as either 
female or male by differentiated dress requirements are problematic from an 
equality standpoint. 90 Courts that reject challenges to sex-tagging dress codes 
85. 375 U.S. 399 (1964). 
86. Id. at 400. 
87. Id. at 403-04. 
88. Id. at 403. 
89. Id. at 402. 
90. The fact that Anderson v. Martin involved an equal protection challenge rather than a Title VII 
one does not undermine this analysis. Congress, by its adoption of Title VII, incorporated at least as 
much of the equality commitments in the context of sex and private employment as had been guaranteed 
to individuals in the context of race and state action under the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection 
guarantees. Mary C. Daly, Some Runs. Some Hits, Some Errors-Keeping Score in the Affirmative 
Action Ballparkfr-om Weber to Johnson, 30 B.C. L. REV. 1, 12 (1988) ("Establishing liability under the 
Equal Protection Clause is more difficult than establishing liability under Title VII."); see also Tracy E. 
Higgins & Laura A. Rosenbury, Agency, Equality, and Antidiscrimination Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 
1194 (2000). To the extent there are interesting questions about the difference between the degree of 
protection offered by the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment and the sex- and 
race-based non-discrimination guarantees of Title VII, they focus on whether Title VII permits race- or 
sex-conscious policies to address historic or existing discrimination (for example, affirmative action) 
and whether equal protection permits disparate impact analysis. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Grutter 
at Work: A Title VII Critique of Constitutional Affirmative Action, 115 YALE L.J. 1408 (2006) 
(analyzing availability of affirmative action programs under Title VII after Grutter); Daly, supra 
(analyzing the availability of disparate impact claims under equal protection); Jared M. Mellott, The 
Diversity Rationalefor Affirmative Action in Employment After Grutter: The Casefor Containment,48 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1091 (2006) (analyzing availability of affirmative action programs consistent 
with Title VII after Grutter); Richard A. Primus, EqualProtectionand Disparate Impact: Round Three, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 493 (2003). In other words, most commentators agree that equal protection sets the 
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allow employers to make sex a relevant characteristic in the workplace. They 
undermine Title VII equality commitments by saying that sex is a meaningful, 
even an important, characteristic in the workplace. In addition, as with the race-
tag example, the sex-tag created by a gender-based dress code in the workplace 
furnishes the vehicle by which sex-based prejudice in the workplace may not 
just be aroused, but tolerated and encouraged. 
Rather than being a benign reflection of cultural norms, gender-based dress 
codes (much like the race markers at issue in Anderson) lie at the heart of the 
problem that equality guarantees seek to address. 
III. Two MODELS OF SEX DISCRIMINATION: A BASIC IDEA
 
AND A POTENTIAL MISSTEP
 
Litigants have used two basic approaches to challenge gender-based dress 
codes: a straightforward sex discrimination claim and a sex stereotyping claim. 
There has recently been much enthusiasm among litigators and theorists for sex 
stereotyping claims. This enthusiasm stems in part from its success in a sex 
discrimination case brought by a senior female executive of a major accounting 
firm who was denied partnership at a time when few could imagine a legal way 
to break through the glass ceiling restricting women's professional 
advancements. 91 Enthusiasm for the theory rests also on its analytical strength 
and the possibility it portends for reversing the Title VII blind spot. I argue that 
because the foundational case that established the theory was one that would 
clearly satisfy inquiries from an anti-subordination approach, there are serious 
limits in the extent to which it may ultimately succeed in challenging gender-
based dress codes that cannot easily be shown to have a group-wide negative 
effect. 
floor for equality guarantees that Title VII extends to the private context even though questions remain 
about what exceptions from equal protection guarantees flow through to Title VII in the context of 
affirmative action and whether equal protection permits disparate impact analysis. 
To be sure, there is a different standard for evaluating sex and race claims under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Cf Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) ("We have held that all racial 
classifications imposed by government must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny." 
(internal quotation omitted)); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996) ("Without equating 
gender classifications, for all purposes, to classifications based on race or national origin, the Court, in 
post-Reed decisions, has carefully inspected official action that closes a door or denies opportunity to 
women (or to men)." (footnote omitted)). There is no textual basis or legislative history, however, to 
support any more relaxed standard of scrutiny for gender-based claims under Title VII nor have courts 
applied one. The only relevant difference between race and sex analysis in the context of Title VII is the 
provision of a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) analysis for sex, but not race. While there 
arguably could be a BFOQ analysis for dress code requirements (or even the sex-tag example raised 
herein), the standard is exceedingly high and no gender-based dress code challenges have even engaged 
it. Anderson v. Martin would be strong precedential support for prohibiting an employer from 
administering a race-based dress code in the context of private employment and is therefore no less 
applicable to a sex-based dress code. 
91. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
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The sex stereotyping theory was explored in 1995 in two important law 
review articles that scrutinized the purported distinction between the use of the 
terms "gender" and "sex." 92 Katherine M. Franke criticized the idea that sex, as 
a biological distinction between men and women, was a legitimate basis for 
classification, but that gender, with its social and cultural construction, was not. 
Mary Ann Case, on the other hand, criticized the disparate treatment of women 
displaying traditionally masculine traits and men displaying traditionally 
feminine traits, which resulted from a failure to see gender as a unique trait. 
She was specifically troubled that courts treated effeminacy in men as an 
indicator of sexual orientation, a trait not clearly protected by Title VII, while 
treating discrimination against masculinity in women as impermissible sex 
discrimination. Both Franke and Case provided historical and social context; 
they more accurately situated associations with the term "sex" and explained 
how those associations were no more fixed, objective, or natural than the 
associations with the term gender.93 Case explored the imprecision involved in 
treating sex and gender as a single trait and the extensive way that traits have 
been gendered in ways that have, over time, increased the ways women, but not 
men, may express themselves. Importantly, both scholars laid the foundation 
for the development of a jurisprudence of sex stereotyping that has been 
instrumental in bringing successful claims of sex discrimination on behalf of 
marginalized people, including transgender persons, masculine women (often, 
but not always, lesbians), and feminine men.94 The ideas developed in these 
articles supported a new theory of sex discrimination-a sex stereotyping claim 
92. Mary Ann Case, DisaggregatingGenderfrom Sex andSexual Orientation:The Effeminate Man 
in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995); Katherine M. Franke, The Central 
Mistake of Sex DiscriminationLaw: The Disaggregationof Sex From Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1 
(1995). 
93. Interestingly, this was a false distinction that Justice Scalia had noted a year earlier. See J.E.B. 
v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 157 n.l (1994) (Scalia, J.,dissenting) ("Throughout this opinion, 
I shall refer to the issue as sex discrimination rather than (as the Court does) gender discrimination. The 
word "gender" has acquired the new and useful connotation of cultural or attitudinal characteristics (as 
opposed to physical characteristics) distinctive to the sexes. That is to say, gender is to sex as feminine is 
to female and masculine to male. The present case does not involve peremptory strikes exercised on the 
basis of femininity or masculinity (as far as it appears, effeminate men did not survive the prosecution's 
peremptories). The case involves, therefore, sex discrimination plain and simple."). 
94. Case, supra note 92; Franke, supra note 92; see also Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 
729, 737 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding discrimination against a police officer's gender non-conforming 
behavior and appearance actionable under to Title VII); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th 
Cir. 2004) (finding discrimination against a firefighter's gender non-conforming behavior and 
appearance actionable under Title VII); Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm, Inc., No. Civ.A. 05-243, 2006 
WL 456173 (W.D. Pa. Feb.17, 2006) (finding discrimination against a sales representative for gender 
non-conforming behavior and appearance actionable under Title VII); Kastl v. Maricopa County Cmty. 
Coll. Dist., No. Civ. 02-153]PHX-SRB, 2004 WL 2008954, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2004) (finding 
employment termination for failure to conform to gender stereotypes in the use of restrooms actionable 
under Title VII); Tronetti v. TLC HealthNet Lakeshore Hosp., No. 03-CV-0375E(SC), 2003 WL 
22757935 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2003) (finding discrimination against an employee for failure to "act like 
a man" impermissible under Title VII); Doe v. United Consumer Fin. Servs., No. 1:01 CV 1112, 2001 
WL 34350174, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2001) (finding discrimination against an employee for gender 
non-conforming behavior and appearance actionable under Title VII). 
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as distinct from a straightforward sex discrimination claim. Despite its 
promise, though, this theory's success has been limited in the general area of 
gender-based dress distinctions in employment. 
95 
In this Part, I explain and distinguish both sex stereotyping and 
straightforward sex discrimination claims. I then argue that the reason why the 
sex stereotyping theory has achieved less success in the context of dress code 
challenges than it has in the context of harassment claims brought by gay, 
lesbian, bisexual, and transgender litigants is because it requires a 
demonstration of group subordination that ignores the individualized harms 
associated with gender-based dress codes. 
A. StraightforwardSex Discrimination 
Enthusiasm for sex stereotyping claims coupled with the apparent 
difficulty of understanding the harms associated with gender-based dress codes 
for non-gender conforming people has had the unfortunate effect of altering the 
way dress code cases are litigated. The result has been that many litigants 
ignore the possibility of bringing straightforward sex discrimination claims, 
claims that require only a demonstration of differentiation on the basis of sex. 
The straightforward claim described in this section is one supported by 
direct evidence of sex discrimination. So much progress has been made towards 
women's equality in the workplace that there are very few reported 
contemporary Title VII decisions involving direct evidence sex discrimination 
cases. 9 6 Direct evidence is "conduct or statements by persons involved in the 
decision-making process, which indicate a discriminatory attitude was more 
likely than not a motivating factor in the employer's decision."97 Few direct 
evidence cases are brought because, in most cases in which an employer admits 
that the reason for different treatment is an employee's sex, the parties settle the 
95. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006) ("There is no 
evidence in this record to indicate that the policy was adopted to make women bartenders conform to a 
commonly-accepted stereotypical image of what women should wear . . . . [Were we to accept 
Jespersen's argument], we would come perilously close to holding that every grooming, apparel, or 
appearance requirement that an individual finds personally offensive, or in conflict with his or her own 
self-image, can create a triable issue of sex discrimination."). 
96. Recent Fourteenth Amendment equal protection cases involving direct evidence are easier to 
find. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that excluding women from a citizen-
soldier program offered at Virginia military college violated the Equal Protection Clause); Miss. Univ. 
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding that a state-supported university policy limiting 
nursing school enrollment to women violated the Equal Protection Clause); Faulkner v. Jones, 51 F.3d 
440 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that the exclusion of women from the Citadel violated the Equal Protection 
Clause). This is true, in part, because of the establishment of the "real difference" jurisprudence and 
indeterminate mid-level scrutiny for equal protection. In practical reality, employment cases in both the 
private and public context rarely involve cases (other than in the dress code context) in which employers 
make decisions explicitly and unapologetically because of an employee's sex. 
97. Kratzer v. Rockwell Collins, Inc., 398 F.3d 1040, 1046 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989)). Where there is direct evidence, the burden is on the employer to 
prove that it would have made the same decision absent the illegitimate motive. Id. 
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case before a court's ultimate resolution of it. This is due both to the power of 
the "smoking gun"98 and to the considerable burden imposed on the employer, 
not just to state a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment 
decisions, but to prove it was the actual one acted upon for the disparate 
treatment despite its facially contradictory actions.
99 
Most reported contemporary sex discrimination cases may be characterized 
not as direct evidence but as indirect evidence cases that require a McDonnell 
°° 
Douglasl burden-shifting analysis. McDonnell Douglas requires a litigant to 
demonstrate (1) that he was a member of a protected class; (2) that he was 
qualified for the job in question; (3) that, despite his qualifications, he was 
rejected or fired; and (4) that, after his rejection or termination, the position 
remained open and the employer continued to seek applications from persons 
of complainant's qualifications or the employer replaced the employee with 
someone of the opposite sex. 0 1 Upon the plaintiff's successful pleading of 
these elements, the burden of production then shifts to the employer to 
demonstrate that it had a non-discriminatory justification for the different 
2treatment. 10 The burden ultimately falls to the employee to show that the 
proffered justification is pretextual and that the real reason for the adverse
3 
employment action was discriminatory.'0 
98. Examples of direct evidence, or "smoking guns," include "epithets or slurs uttered by an 
authorized agent of the employer, a decisionmaker's admission that he would or did act against the 
plaintiff because of his or her protected characteristic, or, even more clearly, an employer policy framed 
squarely in terms of race, sex, religion, or national origin." HAROLD S. LEWIS & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND PRACTICE 165 (2d ed. 2004). Notwithstanding the 
significance of this determination, "there remains rampant disagreement and confusion in the appellate 
decisional understanding ofwhat evidence is 'direct."' Id.at 167. 
99. The dearth of reported direct evidence cases suggests Title VII is largely working. More recent 
Title VII claims generally do not involve categorical exclusions of women from positions of 
employment as reported in older cases. See, e.g., Burkey v. Marshall County Bd. of Ed., 513 F. Supp. 
1084 (N.D.W. Va. 1981) (restricting coaching positions for boys' sports to male teachers violates Title 
VII); Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763, 767 (D.D.C. 1973) (restricting purser jobs at airline 
to men violates Title VII); see also City of L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 
(1978) (holding that a pension plan requiring greater contributions by women violates Title VII). 
100. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
101. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. It should be noted that the McDonnell Douglas 
framework used to build a prima facie case is "an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement." 
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002). Accordingly, while the plaintiff will likely use 
thismethod to inferentially prove disparate treatment, she does not need to plead these elements in her 
complaint. See also LEWIS & NORMAN, supranote 98, at 181 n.8. 
102. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see also LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 98, at 182 
(stating that when a member of a protected class "is not hired for a vacant job, the failure to hire alone 
suffices to raise an inference of discrimination, which the employer must then rebut by producing 
evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason"). 
103. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05 (noting that the plaintiff "must be given a full and 
fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his 
rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision ....").While the purpose of the 
McDonnell Douglas test is to eliminate at the outset the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for an 
employer to deny employment or advancement to an employee, thereby increasing the likelihood that 
the employer actually ran afoul of Title VII in its employment decisions, the burden of demonstrating 
discrimination nevertheless remains with the plaintiff throughout. Because the defendant's obligation to 
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for itsemployment decision is a burden of production 
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 19:353 
Dress code cases easily fit into this straightforward sex discrimination 
claim. In a classic dress code case, such as Jespersen,the plaintiff loses her job 
for refusing to comply with a dress code that requires her to conform her 
outward appearance to a certain standard simply because she is a woman.04 
Under the most straightforward analysis of discrimination, firing this employee 
because she failed to conform her outward appearance is termination "because 
of sex"-had she been a man, she would not have been fired. Few, if any, 
logical leaps need be made to understand the claim or how it fits within Title 
0 5 
VII's direct evidence model. 
1
Despite the strength of its logic, the claim generally fails because the court 
misperceives the relevance of anti-subordination theory. In Jespersen, the
°6 
Ninth Circuit inexplicably required a demonstration of a group-based harm.' 
The court ignored the formal inequality demonstrated in the workplace and 
imposed a requirement of some showing of group subordination. 
The distinction between direct and indirect evidence may explain the 
court's confusion about when an individual harm, as opposed to a group-based 
harm, must be demonstrated. In direct evidence cases, a plaintiff alleges facts 
that alone support a legal determination that she was treated differently (not 
hired, fired, etc.) "because of sex."' 07 In indirect evidence cases, because the 
employee must demonstrate that the basis for the different treatment was her 
sex and not the nondiscriminatory reason that the employer has proffered, how 
the employer treats women as a class is significant in Ways that are simply 
irrelevant in the direct evidence context. Specifically, the employer's treatment 
of women generally becomes relevant because it may strengthen or prove 
pretextual the employer's nondiscriminatory justification. For example, in the 
classic pretext case, an employee is fired for bad reviews, the employee alleges 
that reason is pretextual, and the employer supports its justification by showing 
that many women got good reviews. 
In other words, treatment of other women matters in the classic indirect 
evidence case. It does not, however, matter in direct evidence cases. In direct 
evidence cases, the discrimination claim is proved by the truth of the evidence 
of differential treatment. In indirect evidence cases, no such evidence is 
available so the court must resort to group-wide treatment in order to 
substantiate the claim. 
only, the plaintiff will usually need to demonstrate, either through affirmative evidence or through 
showing the proffered explanation to be implausible, that the pretext is false. LEWIS & NORMAN, supra 
note 98, at 182-94. 
104. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1177 (9th Cir. 2006). 
105. The logic of the straightforward sex discrimination claim has not, however, led to its success. 
See supranote 8. 
106. Jespersen,444 F.3d at 1112 ("The record contains nothing to suggest the grooming standards 
would objectively inhibit a woman's ability to do the job. The only evidence in the record to support the 
stereotyping claim is Jespersen's own subjective reaction to the makeup requirement."). 
107. See infra notes 109 & 156. 
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The dress code cases addressed by this Article are direct evidence cases 
and, as such, would be easily resolved by first generation principles if only 
courts would properly apply them.' 0 8 A plaintiff alleges that a policy treats 
women differently than men. The plaintiff must then demonstrate only the 
existence of the policy. If the policy classifies on an impermissible basis, it is 
unlawful. Requiring a litigant to prove that the different treatment of women 
has no subordinating effect generally on women is beyond the requirement of a 
direct evidence claim even if it might be relevant (and even provable) 0 9 in the 
indirect evidence context and under second generation anti-subordination 
principles. 
B. Sex Stereotyping 
Building on the foundational case of Price Waterhouse, Professor 
Katherine Franke theorized that the sex stereotyping theory could be important 
in the context of transgender litigants and other gender non-conforming 
persons, including some gay and lesbian employees, masculine women, and 
° feminine men. 1 0 While this claim has proven successful in such cases, it has 
had less traction when pursued by litigants who are not characterized, at least 
by the report of the case, as either transgender or gay. The reason for the limits 
of the sex stereotyping theory in practice is its ultimate incorporation of the 
anti-subordination approach associated with second generation equality theory. 
In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court addressed the burden shifting 
requirements under Title VII. In dicta, the Court stated that a woman who 
proffered evidence that she received an adverse employment decision due to a 
failure to conform to expectations of gendered expression in the workplace had 
stated a claim of sex discrimination.1 1  As the Court explained, "an employer 
who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she 
must not be, has acted on the basis of gender." 11i This was a key advance in 
Title VII law. Franke understood it to mean that "[e]mployment decisions made 
108. See supranotes 23-29 and accompanying text. 
109. In Rosa, by way of example, the court noted that, to succeed in her claim, she would only have 
to prove that the bank denied her loan because she was a man dressed as a woman rather than a woman 
dressed as a man, that is, that her loan was denied "because of sex;" she would not have to prove that the 
bank had a general policy of subordinating all men dressed like women. Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust 
Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215-16 (1 st Cir. 2000) ("[U]nder Price Waterhouse, 'stereotyped remarks' [including 
statements about dressing more 'femininely'] can certainly be evidence that gender played a part.") 
(citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989). 
110. Franke, supra note 92. Beyond being theorized, the claim has been litigated to great success 
and is now well-established despite some backlash. See Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, Unprincipled 
Exclusions: The Struggle To Achieve Judicialand Legislative Equalityfor Transgender People, 7 WM. 
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 37 (2000). But see Maurice Wexler & Angie Davis, Transsexualism, Sex 
Stereotyping, and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A Staircase to Paradiseor a Slippery Slope?, 36 U. 
MEM. L. REV. 41 (2005) (criticizing the theory in the context oftransgender litigants). 
11. PriceWaterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250. 
112. Id. 
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on the basis of gender role identity are now included within the meaning of 
3discrimination 'because of one's sex."' 1 Further, Franke explained, "The 
law... should no longer require... that discriminatory conduct be directed 
exclusively at one or the other biological sex. Any adverse action in the 
workplace on account of a person's gender should be cognizable under Title
1 14 
VII, regardless of the body parts of the plaintiff or the defendant."
'
This somewhat aspirational articulation of the meaning of Price 
Waterhouse has been compromised in practice.1 15 One reason is that because 
Price Waterhouse was actually a straightforward sex discrimination case116 
there is some suggestion that there is no separate sex stereotyping theory to be 
developed out of the case. Another reason is that there is a dispute about the 
central holding of the case. In one version, Price Waterhouse stands for the 
proposition that any sex stereotyping in the workplace is impermissible and 
violative of Title VII. In another, PriceWaterhouse means that sex stereotyping 
is impermissible only insofar as it has a pernicious effect on the advancement 
of women in the workplace. 117 For courts that adopt the latter interpretation, a 
sex stereotyping claim ultimately reflects second generation equality principles 
113. Franke, supra note 92, at 95. 
114. Id. 
115. i know this because of my efforts early in the development of the sex stereotyping theory to 
expand its use. In 1999, armed with the developed sex stereotyping theory as described by Franke and 
Case, I brought a sex discrimination claim on behalf of a bank loan applicant (biologically male) who 
was denied the opportunity to apply for a loan because he did not appear sufficiently masculine. The 
case was brought under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, a banking statute that is interpreted to be 
consistent with Title VII principles. See Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 
2000). The case was ultimately successful, at least in defeating a motion to dismiss, and I have 
elsewhere described the theory behind the case and the role it could play in the development of the sex 
stereotyping theory. See Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellant Lucas Rosa, Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust 
Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000) (No. 99-2309), available at Jennifer L. Levi, Brieffor the Plaintiff-
Appellant Lucas Rosa in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Lucas Rosa v. Park 
West Bank and Trust Company on Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts, 7 MICH.J. GENDER & L. 147 (2001); Katherine M. Franke, Lucas Rosa v. Park West 
Bank and Trust Company, 7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 141 (2001); Jennifer L. Levi, Epilogue, 7 MICH. J. 
GENDER & L. 179 (2001). Despite its early success, I got a glimpse of some of the difficulty that the 
theory might pose to judges at a later procedural stage of a case. At the panel hearing, I was repeatedly 
asked a question which I could not understand. When I finally parsed through it, I realized I was being 
asked what the plaintiff might prove at trial to demonstrate a successful claim under a sex stereotyping 
theory. More specifically, I was asked whether it was only impermissible for a bank to impose a dress 
code that enforced gender-based stereotypes. In other words, could a bank require men and women to 
dress differently when applying for a loan as long as it did not have unfair and gender-based stereotypes 
about the creditworthiness of males and females? As asked by the judge, why wouldn't the first (the 
dress requirement) be simply difference and the latter be discrimination? It was at this point that I 
realized the sex stereotyping theory might not be a panacea for gaps in the straightforward sex 
discrimination claim, at least in the dress code context. 
116. See, e.g., Kratzer v. Rockwell Collins, Inc., 398 F.3d 1040, 1045-46 (8th Cir. 2005) ("Kratzer 
may proceed under Price Waterhouse if she produces direct evidence of conduct or statements by 
persons involved in the decision-making process, which indicate a discriminatory attitude was more 
likely than not a motivating factor in the employer's decision.") (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 
258). 
117. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 ("An employer who objects to aggressiveness in women 
but whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of 
ajob if they behave aggressively and out ofajob ifthey do not."). 
2008] Misapplying Equality Theories 
and requires not simply a showing of sex stereotyping (or differentiation 
between men and women) but subordination as well. Because most women are 
gender conforming, such a showing is difficult, at best, to make. 
Despite its success in the area of transgender and lesbian/gay plaintiffs," 8 
in practice the sex stereotyping theory has proven far less useful for 
nontransgender litigants, such as Darlene Jespersen,"19 who have brought 
challenges to sex-based dress policies. This theory, which has been so 
successful at the margins, has not moved the courts at the center (for example, 
in cases involving dress codes brought by seemingly gender conforming 
individuals). Further, sex stereotyping reasoning has been rejected recently in a 
case brought by a transgender litigant 120 in favor of the older, rejected theory 
(the straightforward sex discrimination claim), in order to preserve the Title VII 
blind spot now so well-established in law. 
IV. RECENT CASELAW OFFERS SOME IMPORTANT INSIGHT 
Two recently decided cases, Jespersen and Schroer, merit discussion 
because they illustrate that second generation anti-subordination equality theory 
has sometimes inappropriately supplanted first generation principles and 
because they offer an opportunity to evaluate the strength of the alternative 
litigation strategies offered by this Article. In Jespersen, the court looked past 
the existence of disparate sex-based grooming requirements and the harm to an 
individual forced to comply, denying relief because women as a class were not 
harmed by the policy. Schroer illustrates the practical limits of the sex 
stereotyping theory and supports the predictive claim that returning courts' 
focus to first generation principles may be the only hope for change in the area 
of dress code challenges. 
A. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co. 
In Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., plaintiff Darlene Jespersen, a 
twenty-year employee of the defendant company, challenged a sex-
all of Harrah's employees. 
12 1 
differentiated grooming policy imposed on 
118. See infranote 158. 
119. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006). 
120. Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 210-11 (D.D.C. 2006). 
121. See Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004). For the twenty 
years that Jespersen worked at Harrah's, her employer encouraged her (and other female beverage 
servers) to wear makeup, although it was not a job requirement. Id. at 1077. It was not until 2000 that 
Harrah's implemented its "Beverage Department Image Transformation" program and imposed
"appearance standards" on its employees. Id. Although all beverage servers, regardless of gender, were 
required to be "well groomed, appealing to the eye, be firm and body toned, and be comfortable with 
maintaining this look while wearing the specified uniform," it incorporated sex-differentiated 
requirements to carry out its goals. Id. Notably, women were required to wear colored nail polish, make­
up, and styled hair; men were prohibited from doing so. Id. 
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Among other things, the policy required female, but not male, bartenders to 
tease, curl, or style their hair and to wear stockings and nail polish. 122 It also 
required them to attend a "Personal Best" program, which taught them how to 
maximize their appearance and conform to that appearance every day at their 
job. 123 
Jespersen found the requirements so inconsistent with her gender identity 
that she declined to comply with the policy and, as a result, lost her job. 124 She 
testified that wearing makeup adversely affected her self-esteem and mental 
health. Years earlier, she had worn make-up for a short time in an attempt to 
heed her employer's prior suggestion, but not requirement, that women 
employees wear make-up.1 25 She stopped after a short time, however, because 
she found that wearing it "made her feel sick, degraded, exposed, and 
violated."' 126 As the Ninth Circuit explained, she "felt that wearing makeup 
'forced her to be feminine' and to become 'dolled up' like a sexual object,
' 127 
and... 'took away [her] credibility as an individual and as a person.' 
During the litigation, Harrah's never questioned the sincerity of Jespersen's 
response to the make-up requirement and both the majority and dissent 
accepted, as they had to, the allegations relating to the effect on Jespersen of 
her compliance with the policy.' 28 That is, Harrah's never challenged 
Jespersen's claim that the job requirements she faced because she was a woman 
made her incapable of doing her job. 
Jespersen's claim under Title VII was a straightforward sex discrimination 
claim: The "Personal Best" program required female employees to conform-
and prohibited male employees from conforming-to certain dress and make­
up standards and, therefore, constituted disparate treatment based on sex. 
As is reflective of dress code cases generally, when the Ninth Circuit 
reheard the case en banc, very little, if any, of the dismissal of Jespersen's 
disparate treatment claim rested on traditional disparate treatment analysis. 
Rather, the panel relied on a doctrinal exception created for dress codes. The 
panel stated that different treatment (for example, differentiation) is not 
sufficient to prove a discrimination claim based on a dress code policy. Citing a 
broad, doctrinal exception to the general rule for proving a disparate impact 
claim, the panel explained that the "settled law in this circuit,.., does not 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 1078. Some pretty incredible details relating to the Personal Best program are omitted 
from the en banc opinion. As detailed in the Ninth Circuit's three-judge panel decision, not only did 
employees have to attend a full training to learn how to dress and groom themselves to look their best, 
the training culminated in a picture being taken of each employee looking his or her best. Id. The picture 
was then distributed to his or her supervisor and a daily evaluation was made of each employee's ability 
to measure up to his or her stylized self. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 1077. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. (noting that the "facts are undisputed"). 
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support Jespersen's position that a sex-based difference in appearance 




What is so exceptional about the panel's analysis is the suggestion that the 
demonstration of different treatment of men and women is not, alone, direct 
evidence of discrimination. Even though different treatment alone proves sex 
discrimination in nearly every other situation, the panel decided that, in the 
context of dress codes, different treatment is not enough to prove a claim.13
0 
Circuit used the language of "disparate effects,"'
' 31 
Oddly, the Ninth 
suggesting that it actually meant that Jespersen failed to prove class-based 
effects (or harm) rather than an individualized impact on her "because of 
sex."'132 After stating the exception that it applies in sex discrimination cases, 
the court articulated an "unequal-burdens" test focused on whether female 
employees are more significantly burdened than their male counterparts as 
proof of what it characterized as "disparate effects."' 133 This seems to be more 
accurately characterized as a class-based effect (or harm).1
34 
While courts have used the "unequal burdens" language in evaluating the 
legitimacy of dress codes, generally they have not applied that test as 
129. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
130. See, e.g., Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 755 (9th Cir. 1977) ("It is clear that 
regulations promulgated by employers which require male employees to conform to different grooming 
and dress standards than female employees is not sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII."); 
Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977) (affirming the district court's dismissal for 
failure to state a claim where the plaintiff alleged the employer mandated shorter hair for male 
employees than for female employees); Earwood v. Cont'l Se. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1350 (4th Cir. 
1976) ("[S]ex-differentiated grooming standards do not, without more, constitute discrimination under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."); Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685, 685 (2d 
Cir. 1976) (per curiam) ("[R]equiring short hair on men and not on women does not violate Title VII."); 
Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975) ("[W]e conclude that minor differences 
in personal appearance regulations that reflect customary modes of grooming do not constitute sex 
discrimination .... ); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975) (en 
banc) (holding that gender differentiated grooming standards related to hair length are not prohibited 
because they do not inhibit employment opportunities based on immutable or protected characteristics); 
Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 896 (9th Cir. 1974) ("We are not persuaded that tolerance of 
a certain hair length for female employees but not for males 'discriminates' on the basis of sex within 
the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 
1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("We do not believe that Title VII was intended to invalidate grooming 
regulations which have no significant effect upon the employment opportunities afforded one sex in 
favor of the other."). 
131. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109 ( "Harrah's 'Personal Best' policy contains sex-differentiated 
requirements regarding each employee's hair, hands, and face."). 
132. Id. ("While those individual requirements differ according to gender, none on its face places a 
greater burden on one gender than the other."). 
133. Id. at 1109-10. 
134. Id. at 1110 ("The material issue under our settled law is not whether the policies are different, 
but whether the policy imposed on the plaintiff creates an 'unequal burden' for the plaintiff's 
gender .... Under established equal burdens analysis, when an employer's grooming and appearance 
policy does not unreasonably burden one gender more than the other, that policy will not violate Title 
VII."). 
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mechanistically as the Ninth Circuit did in Jespersen.135 The Ninth Circuit 
panel that first decided the case on appeal characterized the application of the 
test to Jespersen as one of first impression, 136  arguably because it 
misinterpreted the unequal burdens precedent. 
Further, rather than acknowledging that sex discrimination law protects 
individuals, not just classes of individuals, the Ninth Circuit turned Title VII on 
its head in interpreting its precedent to mean that Darlene Jespersen could not 
prevail unless she demonstrated that all women were burdened, not just those 
women offended and harmed by having to wear make-up. As a result, the Ninth 
Circuit departed from well-established law.
1 37 
Judge Kozinski 38 dissented, joined by two other judges. 139 He argued that 
the majority's error was, in essence, applying anti-subordination equality 
principles to a case that did not necessitate it.14° Rather than focusing solely on 
whether all women are harmed by a dress code policy, Judge Kozinski looked 
at whether the plaintiff was harmed because she was a woman. 14 1 His criticism 
of the majority was that it missed the individual harm that the grooming 
requirement cause for some-even if not all-women. 142 He explained that, in 
his view, the court incorrectly dismissed the evidence of gender-based harm 
because of its undue focus on whether the policy substantially burdened all 
women. 143 Notably, his dissent acknowledged that people who happen to fit the 
stereotypes of what real women or real men should look or act like are 
advantaged by the majority's approach and identified the gendered norm as 
being culturally, not biologically or "naturally," prescribed.144 As Kozinski 
explained, the majority's dismissal of the case for lack of demonstration of the 
policy's substantial burden on all women 
presupposes that Jespersen is unreasonable or idiosyncratic in her 
discomfort. Why so? Whether to wear cosmetics-literally, the face 
135. See Marybeth Herald, Deceptive Appearances: Judges, Cognitive Bias, and Dress Codes, 41 
U.S.F. L. REV, 299, 317-21 (describing and critiquing the "unequal burdens" test and its application in 
Jespersen). 
136. See Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004). 
137. Even under constitutional equal protection analysis, the Supreme Court has held that an 
individual can state a claim of unequal treatment as a "class of one." Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 
U.S. 562, 564 (2000) ("Our cases have recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a 'class 
of one,' where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others 
similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment." (citing Sioux City 
Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Comm'n of 
Webster City, 488 U.S. 336 (1989))). 
138. Hardly a liberal, Judge Kozinski has been described as a "conservative libertarian." Jeffery 
Rosen, PerhapsNot A11 Affirmative Action Is Created Equal, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2006, at 14. 
139. Jespersen,444 F.3d at 1117-18 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Judge Pregerson wrote a separate 
dissent, joined by Judges Kozinski, Graber, and Fletcher. Id,at 1113-17. 
140. Id.at 1117 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
141. Id.atl118. 
142. See id. 
143. See id. at 1117. 
144. See id. 
2008] Misapplying Equality Theories 
one presents to the world-is an intensely personal choice .... If you 
are used to wearing makeup-as most American women are-this may 
seem like no big deal. But those of us not used to wearing makeup 
would find a requirement that we do so highly intrusive. Imagine, for 
example, a rule that all judges wear face powder, blush, mascara and 
lipstick while on the bench. Like Jespersen, I would find such a regime 
burdensome and demeaning; it would interfere with my job 
performance. 1
45 
Moreover, even if the court had correctly applied an unequal burdens test 
(that is to say, required a demonstration of subordination), it is nearly laughable 
to imagine that the Harrah's policy could have survived it, as Judge Kozinski 
explains in dissent. 146 The court concluded that Jespersen could not prove her 
case because she had not introduced evidence that could prove that wearing 
make-up on a daily basis pursuant to the "Personal Best" program would take 
more money or time than was required by the men to maintain appropriate 
haircuts and trimmed nails.14 7 As Judge Kozinski empathically explained: 
Even those of us who don't wear makeup know how long it can take 
from the hundreds of hours we've spent over the years frantically 
tapping our toes and pointing to our wrists. It's hard to imagine that a 
woman could "put on her face," as they say, in the time it would take a 
man to shave. .. . While a man could jog to the casino, slip into his 
uniform, and get right to work, a woman must travel to work so as to 
avoid smearing her makeup, or arrive early to put on her makeup 
there. 148 
The case of "unequal burdens" is proved for the dissent by the fact that 
Jespersen's male colleagues would not be forced to make the choice between 
wearing make-up and losing their jobs. In the end, the dissent saw the problem 
with the dress code under both first and second generation equality principles. 
145. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1117-18 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Quite remarkably, Judge Kozinski 
has engaged in a thought experiment I urged litigants to press upon courts considering these types of 
claims. See Jennifer L. Levi, Clothes Don't Make the Man (or Woman), But GenderIdentity Might, 15 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 90, 111-12 (2006). That thought experiment was drawn from the powerful 
message included in the introduction to Daphne Scholinski's book, The Last Time I Wore A Dress. See 
SCHOLINSKI, supra note 75. Proving a point I have made elsewhere, it is only when those who enjoy 
gender conformity privilege can see that privilege and imagine their lives lived without it that the 
magnitude of the effect of the imposition ofgender norms will be acknowledged. 
146. As Judge Kozinski explained, "I find it perfectly clear that Harrah's overall grooming policy is 
substantially more burdensome for women than for men. Every requirement that forces men to spend 
time or money on their appearance has a corresponding requirement that is as, or more, burdensome for 
women: short hair v. 'teased, curled, or styled' hair; clean trimmed nails v. nail length and color 
requirements; black leather shoes v. black leather shoes. The requirement that women spend time and 
money applying full facial makeup has no corresponding requirement for men, making the 'overall 
policy' more burdensome for the former than for the latter." Jespersen,444 F.3d at 1117 (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting) (citations omitted). Empathically, Judge Kozinski went on to note, "[l]s there any doubt that 
putting on makeup costs money and take time? ... You don't need an expert witness to figure out that 
[makeup] do[es]n't grow on trees . I...Id. 
147. Id. at 1111 ("Having failed to create a record establishing that the 'Personal Best' policies are 
more burdensome for women than for men, Jespersen did not present any triable issue of fact."). 
148. Id. at 1117-18 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
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The second part of the panel's analysis addressed the sex stereotyping 
challenge to the dress policy. In dismissing the sex stereotyping theory for 
Jespersen's sex discrimination claim, the panel emphasized that the policy does 
not "single out" Jespersen. 149 This reference to singling out is odd because sex 
stereotyping does not normally require any singling out. Rather, it focuses on 
the group impact of a policy. The majority explained the policy applied to all 
bartenders, male and female, and "for the most part" was unisex.150 The court 
nevertheless held that the policy (despite the clearly non-unisex rules relating to 
make-up and hair styling) was not "adopted to make women bartenders 
conform to a commonly-accepted stereotypical image of what women should 
wear."1 51 Ignoring the obvious, the court retreated to the alternative reading of 
Price Waterhouse-the one suggesting the case was about the glass ceiling for 
women in male-dominated work environments and not about some more 
general problem with gender stereotypes. Because the court found that the 
grooming standards did not "objectively inhibit a woman's ability to do the 
job,"'52 it denied Jespersen's sex stereotyping claim. 
What is most striking about the stereotyping analysis in Jespersen is that it 
departs from the direction that most courts have gone in the context of other sex 
discrimination claims, particularly those brought by gay/lesbian and 
transgender litigants, including cases involving dress policy challenges and sex 
harassment.153 That is, other courts hearing such claims in cases not directly 
addressing the legitimacy of dress codes have taken the Supreme Court at its 
word in Price Waterhouse that 
we are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by 
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with 
their group, for "[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against 
individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the 
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting 
from sex stereotypes." 1 
149. Id. at 1111. The reason I characterize this as "odd" is because, in the first part ofthe opinion, 
the court focused on Jespersen's failure to demonstrate that the policy had a group-based harm. In the 
second part, the court focused on Jespersen's failure to demonstrate an individual singling out by the 
policy. She was damned that she didn't and damned that she did. 
ISO. Id.at 1112. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. 1 have argued elsewhere that where courts can sufficiently distinguish themselves from the 
litigant bringing a claim as a result of evidence related to a diagnosed condition, the harms associated 
with sex-based dress policies are more apparent, though less threatening, and the litigants' claims have, 
as in the context of transgender litigants, been more successful. See Levi, supra note 145, at 100-04. In 
that article, I argued that the inclusion of a disability claim allowed judges to marginalize the nature of 
the claim and acknowledge the impermissibility of a gender-based dress code. I also argued that the 
Jespersen outcome, though widespread, is analytically insupportable. 
154. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (citing L.A. Dep't of Water & Power 
v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 
1198 (7th Cir. 1971)). 
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The Jespersen analysis suggests that, despite the evolution of the sex 
stereotyping theory, courts remain comfortable with the enforcement of 
gendered stereotypes as long as the enforcement does not create a group-wide 
problem for women. Notably, the court relied on the anti-subordination 
principle associated with second generation theory to legitimize the 
enforcement of such gendered norms. 
B. Schroer v. Billington 
The second case that frames this discussion is Schroer v. Billington.155 The 
case is important because it is one in which a litigant, Diane Schroer, 
successfully 156  brought a claim advancing both sex stereotyping and 
straightforward sex discrimination theories. Only her straightforward sex 
discrimination theory was credited. The court went to lengths to explain that it 
was rejecting her sex stereotyping theory because of a fear of its success in a 
different context-that of dress codes.' 57 In Schroer, unlike in Jespersen, the 
court credited the demonstration of formal inequality and imposed no 
additional hurdle relating to anti-subordination. At the same time, though, it 
preserved the ability of courts to avoid doing so in the context of dress codes. 
Significantly, the case departed analytically from a recent line of precedent 
protecting transsexual people under a sex stereotyping theory. 158 Although 
155. 424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2006). 
156. The Plaintiff survived a motion to dismiss. Id. at 213 (denying defendant's motion to dismiss 
because the facts could "support [Schroer's] claim that the library refused to hire her solely because of 
her sexual identity, and that in doing so, the library discriminated against her 'because of sex'). 
Following its denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court "directed the parties to develop an 
appropriate factual record, 'one that reflects the scientific basis of sexual identity in general, and gender 
dysphoria in particular,' to which the Court could look when making its legal determination as to 
whether Plaintiff states a claim for discrimination 'because of sex."' Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and in the Alternative for Judgment on the Pleadings at 9, Schroer v. 
Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 05-1090), 2007 WL 2125236, available at 
http://www.aclu.org/images/asset..uploadfile69_30088.pdf. Both parties retained experts who made 
reports to the court. Id. at 2. The defendant then filed a second motion to dismiss. On June 11, 2007, the 
plaintiff filed a memorandum opposing defendant's motion and requesting an evidentiary hearing to 
resolve contradictory representations in the experts' reports. Id. at 1-2. 
157. Schroer,424 F. Supp. 2d at 210-11. 
158. Id. Historically, courts denied sex discrimination claims brought by transsexual persons for 
two different but related reasons. Some courts explained that the language of Title VII, including the 
term "sex," was not intended to provide protections for transsexual people, as demonstrated by 
Congress's failure to pass explicit laws to cover gay and lesbian people. The second explanation for 
courts' refusal to protect transsexual people under Title VII law was that, in the view of those courts, 
Title VII was intended to cover exclusively women qua women and men qua men. Some courts viewed 
transsexual people as neither men nor women and therefore not covered by existing law. See Ulane v. E. 
Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) ("The phrase in Title VII prohibiting discrimination 
based on sex, in its plain meaning, implies that it is unlawful to discriminate against women because 
they are women and against men because they are men .... [A] prohibition against discrimination based 
on an individual's sex is not synonymous with a prohibition against discrimination based on an 
individual's sexual identity disorder or discontent with the sex into which they were born."); Sommers 
v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) ("[T]he major thrust of the 'sex' amendment 
was towards providing equal opportunities for women."); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 
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consistent with these cases in outcome, the Schroer court rejected the sex 
stereotyping theory that other courts had acknowledged while accepting the 
straightforward disparate treatment claim.' 59 Remarkably, the judge explained 
in dicta that the reason for departing from established analysis was to preserve 
the dress code exception under sex discrimination law, even though, as the 
court itself acknowledged, that issue was not before it. 1
60 
The Schroer case presented compelling facts. The plaintiff Diane Schroer 
applied for a position as a terrorism research analyst with the Congressional 
Research Service, a division of the Library of Congress. 161 She was eminently 
659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977) ("A transsexual individual's decision to undergo sex change surgery does not 
bring that individual, nor transsexuals as a class, within the scope of Title VII."); Doe v. U.S. Postal 
Serv., Civ. A. No. 84-3296, 1985 WL 9446, at *2 (D.D.C. June 12, 1985) (agreeing with the Ulane court 
that "a prohibition against discrimination based on an individual's sex is not synonymous with a 
prohibition against discrimination based on an individual's sexual identity disorder."). 
As has comprehensively been described elsewhere, the more recent trend of courts has been to 
reject the earlier unprincipled exclusions of transsexual people from coverage under existing sex 
discrimination laws (both state and federal). Currah & Minter, supra note 114; see also Jennifer L. Levi, 
Pavingthe Road: A CharlesHamilton Houston Approach to Securing Trans Rights, 7 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 5 (2000). Most recent courts that have addressed the question have held that transsexual 
people are covered under existing laws. See, e.g., Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737 (6th 
Cir. 2005) (finding that discrimination against a transsexual police officer based upon the employee's 
gender non-conforming behavior and appearance was actionable pursuant to Title VII); Smith v. City of 
Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that allegations that a transsexual firefighter was 
discriminated against based upon the employee's gender non-conforming behavior and appearance were 
actionable pursuant to Title VII); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding 
that the Gender Motivated Violence Act applies with equal force to both men and women, and that its 
protection extends to transsexuals); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215-16 (1st Cir. 
2000) (holding that allegations that a transsexual bank loan applicant was discriminated against based 
upon the applicant's gender non-conforming behavior and appearance were actionable pursuant to the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act); Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm, Inc., No. Civ.A. 05-243, 2006 WL 
456173 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2006) (holding that allegations that a transsexual sales representative was 
discriminated against based upon the employee's gender non-conforming behavior and appearance were 
actionable pursuant to Title VII); Kastl v. Maricopa County Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. 02-1531-PHX-SRB, 
2004 WL 2008954, at *3 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2004) (holding that an allegation of employment termination 
for failure to conform to gender stereotypes in the use of restrooms was actionable pursuant to Title 
VII); Tronetti v. TLC HealthNet Lakeshore Hosp., No. 03-CV-0375, 2003 WL 22757935, at *4 
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2003) (holding that alleged discrimination against a transsexual employee for 
failing to 'act like a man' is actionable pursuant to Title VII); Doe, 2001 WL 34350174, at *4 (holding 
that allegations that a transsexual employee was discriminated against based upon the employee's 
gender non-conforming behavior and appearance were actionable pursuant to Title VII). But see Etsitty 
v. Utah Transit Auth., No. 2:04CV616 DS, 2004 WL 1505610 (D. Utah June 24, 2005) (stating that 
Congress did not intend transsexuals to be covered by Title VII); Oiler v. Winn-Dixie, Inc., No. Civ.A. 
00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541 (E.D. La. 2002) (same); Dobre v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. 
Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (same); Cox v. Denny's Inc., No. 98-1085-CIV-J-16B, 1999 WL 1317785 
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1999); Underwood v. Archer Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 96, 98 (D.D.C. 1994) 
(holding that being discharged on the basis of one's transsexuality does not violate the District of 
Columbia Human Rights Act). 
159. Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 213 ("There are facts that Schroer could prove which would 
support her claim that the Library refused to hire her solely because of her sexual identity, and that in so 
doing, the Library discriminated against her 'because of... sex."'). 
160. Id. ("Dealing with transsexuality straightforwardly, and applying Title VII to it (if at all) as 
discrimination 'because of... sex,' preserves the outcomes of the post-Price Waterhouse caselaw 
without colliding with the sexual orientation and grooming code lines of cases."). 
161. Id. at 205. 
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qualified for the position, which her potential employer confirmed. 16 2 Schroer 
was a twenty-five-year veteran of the armed services, during which time she 
served in combat and in special operations units. 163 The last portion of her 
military career was spent working with the United States Special Operations 
Command to defeat international terrorist networks.' 64 As part of her job, she 
coordinated a classified operation "charged with tracking and targeting high-
threat international terrorist organizations."' 165 Even after her retirement from 
the military, she continued to work on security matters in the private sector.' 
66 
After interviewing her for an advertised position as a terrorism research 
analyst,'67 the Library of Congress offered Schroer the job.168 Convinced of her 
qualifications, the Library of Congress even followed up with a call to assure 
her that it could meet her private sector salary. 169 Schroer accepted the job. 70 
When Schroer showed up to negotiate some administrative details, she raised 
an issue that had not come up during the interview process. Diane Schroer, who 
had interviewed for the job as David Schroer, dressing and appearing in 
traditionally masculine clothing and appearance, informed her soon-to-be 
employer that she was transsexual. 17 1 Although assigned the sex of male at 
birth, Diane Schroer had a female gender identity and was to begin the process 
of transitioning from male to female consistent with a course of medical 
treatment. 172 She had gone through the interviews before she was able to 
transition and wanted to inform her employer that she was about to begin the 
process of sex-reassignment consistent with a medical protocol. 173 
Charlotte Preece, the representative of the Congressional Research Service 
who had been Schroer's contact, responded that Schroer had "really given [her] 
something to think about."' 74 The next day, Preece called Schroer to say that 
under the circumstances and "for the good of the service," Schroer was no 
longer a "good fit" for the job. 175 About a month and a half later, Schroer 
received a form e-mail stating that the position she had been offered was 
filled. 176 Schroer brought suit claiming that the refusal to hire her violated Title 
162. Id. at 206 ("[The employer] stated that the selection committee believed that Schroer's skills 
and experience made her application far superior to those of the other candidates."). 
163. Id. at 205. 
164. Id. at 205-06. 
165. Id. at 206. Indeed, her analysis in this position merited audiences with the Vice President, the 
Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conduct intelligence briefings. Id. 
166. Id. Schroer worked as a senior analyst and program manager at a private consulting firm that 






172. Id. at 205. 
173. Id. at 206. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 206-07. 
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VII's prohibition against sex discrimination.177 The defendant moved to dismiss 
Schroer's claim citing a long line of cases excluding transsexual litigants from 
protection under Title VII. 178 Diane Schroer countered that the earlier line 
rejecting claims brought by transgender litigants was interrupted and reversed 
by Price Waterhouse and, furthermore, that under a straightforward sex 
discrimination theory, the Library of Congress acted impermissibly by 
withdrawing Schroer's offer because it did so "because of sex." 
179 
Notably, the D.C. District Court rejected Schroer's theory of sex 
stereotyping' but accepted the straightforward sex discrimination claim."' In 
addition to the lengths to which the court went to preserve the "gender-specific 
dress and grooming code"' 182 exception under Title VII, discussed above, this 
analysis is also striking because the court rejected the very claim that prevailed 
in nearly every successful action brought by a transgender litigant. 183 Despite 
rejecting the sex stereotyping theory advanced by Schroer, the court 
nevertheless denied the motion to dismiss on the straightforward argument that 
"discrimination against transsexuals because they are transsexuals is 'literally' 
discrimination because of sex." 184 As the court explained, "Dealing with 
transsexuality straightforwardly, and applying Title VII to it (if at all) as 
discrimination 'because of... sex,' preserves the outcomes of the post-Price 
Waterhouse caselaw without colliding with the.., grooming code lines of 
cases." 1
85 
C. Lessons Drawn 
Jespersen and Schroer highlight the anomaly of the Title VII dress code 
cases. Jespersen does so by replicating the doctrinal and conceptual errors 
courts have made for over thirty years. Schroer does so by the lengths to which 
it goes to ensure the continued vitality of the Title VII blind spot even as the 
court secures legal protections for a transgender Olitigant who historically 
177. Id. at 207. In addition to the Title VII action, her complaint also included an equal protection 
claim. Id. at 205. 
178. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and in the Alternative for Judgment on the Pleadings at 6-7, 
Schroer,424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (No. CIV.A. 05-1090), 2007 WL 2125236. 
179. See Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 210. 
180. Id. at 211 ("PriceWaterhouse does not create a Title VII claim for sex stereotyping in the 
absence of disparate treatment, and . . . the allegations of Schroer's complaint do not assert a Price 
Waterhouse type of claim in any event [because] the logic of such a rule does not extend to situations 
where the dress and makeup are intended to express, and are understood by the employer to be 
expressing, a female identity."). 
181. Id. at 212-13 ("[D]iscrimination against transsexuals because they are transsexuals is 
'literally' discrimination 'because of... sex."' (quoting Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821, 825 
(N.D. I1. 1983))). 
182. Id. at 208. 
183. Indeed, the claim has been central to the reversal of the earlier line of cases that had excluded 
transgender litigants from the scope of Title VII's coverage. See Currah & Minter, supra note 114. 
184. Id. at 212. 
185. Id. at 213. 
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would have been denied them. The litigation suggestions I have offered 
throughout this article could be implemented in a case such as Jespersen to try 
to eradicate the Title VII blind spot. These include: refocusing courts' attention 
on anti-differentiation principles and the limits of anti-subordination ones,1
8 6 
highlighting that the case is one of direct rather than indirect evidence, 8 7 and 
clarifying the harms caused by differentiation even with no evidence of anti-
subordination by analogizing to the sex-tag to the race-tag addressed in 
Anderson v. Martin.18 While it is, of course, impossible to predict the potential 
success of these litigation strategies, the language of both cases supports their 
use. 
CONCLUSION 
In non-dress code contexts, courts readily acknowledge that facially sex-
based practices and policies are presumptively unlawful under Title VII. When 
it comes to dress codes, however, nearly the opposite has proven to be 
true. This pervasive attitude of judicial laissez-faire toward sex-based dress 
codes is increasingly anomalous in the wider context of sex discrimination 
caselaw, yet it shows no signs of abating. 
An over-emphasis on anti-subordination theories has skewed dress code 
caselaw and prevented courts from seeing the discriminatory harms caused by 
sex-specific dress requirements. One way to expose the doctrinal Title VII 
blind spot is for litigants to draw from the race analogy to reveal the harm of 
labeling sex differences in the workplace. The race analogy helps explain that 
the labeling of an employee's sex is harmful because it identifies the 
characteristic of sex as a meaningful distinction in the workplace, something 
that Title VII purports to address. Another specific step that could be taken is to 
do some basic legal education in particular cases about the difference between 
direct and indirect evidence, legal doctrine often ignored or misunderstood by 
the bench and bar. These strategies would be more effective than pursuing the 
currently popular sex stereotyping theory, which has largely failed to expose 
the detrimental impact of sex-based dress codes on employees. It would also do 
much to advance a proper understanding of the relationship between formal and 
anti-subordination equality theories. 
The Jespersenand Schroercases demonstrate the ultimate weakness of the 
sex stereotyping argument in fighting invidiously discriminatory dress code 
policies. As long as courts rely exclusively on group-based equality claims 
rooted in second generation anti-subordination analysis, these dress code 
challenges will likely fail. By reinvigorating the first generation formal equality 
186. See supra Part II.B. 
187. See supra Part 1II.A. 
188. See supra Part lI.D. 
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theory and its call for equal individual rights, however, Title VII can be reborn 
as an effective tool for fighting dress code employment discrimination. This 
does not mean that second generation theories have no place in discrimination 
claims. Where past discriminatory treatment makes present day "fair treatment" 
facially unjust, group-based understandings of rights are appropriate and 
necessary. However, for dress code policies that harm the individual on the 
basis of sex, first generation arguments are a key to regaining lost ground. 
